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Local conflicts and national consensus: The strange case of circular economy in Sweden 
Johan Niskanen, Jonas Anselm and Duncan McLaren 
Abstract 
Swedish press debate regarding the idea of a ‘circular economy’ is analysed to enable critical 
reflection on the development and use of the concept. We examine how actor positions 
formed around ideas of increased circularity. Using press material from 2012 to 2019 we 
identify positions on circular economy taken by Swedish companies, public authorities, 
political parties, and opinion makers. Our analysis reveals convergence amongst these actors 
at the national level despite ongoing situated local environmental conflicts. We show that this 
convergence is enabled by the convening power of ambiguity, which characterizes the use of 
circular economy ideas as an ‘floating signifier’ in the debate. In Sweden ideas of a circular 
economy may have been deployed by resilient capital to harness an otherwise economically 
disruptive process, as a new expression of ecological modernization.  Further research into the 
political economy of circular economy ideas is encouraged. 
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1. Introduction 
In this article we critically reflect on the press debate about the idea of a ‘circular economy’ 
(CE) in Sweden. In the past decade the idea of a CE – as a means to reduce the environmental 
impacts of the industrial economy by designing out waste and minimizing inputs of non-
renewable resources – has moved into mainstream debate in many countries, especially 
through the introduction of policies such as China’s Law on Promoting Circular Economy 
(2008) and the European Union’ Circular Economy Action Plan (2019). 
A CE is commonly framed as a novel production model focused on circular flows of materials 
– an alternative to a conventional ‘linear’ economy in which resources are extracted, used and 
then disposed of (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013). Through the redesign of production 
processes and products triggered through appropriate regulations and tax reforms, CE 
approaches are anticipated to reduce waste, increase employment and sustain business 
competitiveness (Korhonen et al., 2018; Stahel, 2013; Winans et al., 2017).  
Circular economies have increasingly become a topic of interest for academics, not least in 
this journal (Geissdoerfer et al., 2017; Ghisellini et al., 2016; Tukker, 2015, etcetera). Focus 
has often been placed on technological aspects and environmental implications of cleaner 
product design, business models, and industrial symbiosis (Bocken et al., 2016; 
Lewandowski, 2016; Murray et al., 2017), as well as on developments in ‘circularity pioneer’ 
country China (Geng et al., 2013; Su et al., 2013; Yuan et al., 2006).  
Academic literature is predominantly unreflexively positive about CE ideas. Nonetheless 
some scholars have argued that the idea of a CE is thermodynamically naïve (Skene, 2018), or 
inevitably comes with rebound effects undermining environmental benefits (Zink and Geyer, 
2017). It has also been criticized as a distraction from other (more) important issues, e.g., 
equity (Moreau et al., 2017) and for broadly failing to engage with social implications and 
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that a CE is a sustainability illusion if economic growth is not addressed as a problem per se 
(Temesgen et al., 2019).  
Scholars have reviewed the emergence and development of CE narratives. Rieke and 
colleagues (2018) trace the history of CE ideas from a focus on waste management to its 
current revival as a response to resource depletion, and highlight the diversity of activities and 
definitions. Blomsma and Brennan (2017) similarly identify the CE as a ‘umbrella concept’ 
used by multiple stakeholders to encompass diverse activities. Stakeholder narratives of 
circular economies have been mapped at the European level (Lazarevic and Valve, 2017) but 
not yet in leading proponent countries. This paper helps address this gap, with a case study of 
Sweden. We study how key business and public actors perceive and contribute to 
understandings of the idea through an analysis of the CE debate in national and business 
newspapers. Our analysis highlights that the CE concept is sufficiently flexible as to provide a 
valuable convening narrative, however also therefore so vague that it may risk political 
capture, in a way which could compromise its normative value.  
The case of Sweden is of special interest as an early adopter of an ecological modernisation 
(Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000) approach to environmental and climate issues (Anshelm 2002; 
Hysing, 2014; Lidskog and Elander, 2012; Lundqvist, 2004), which has more recently 
established a goal of being at the forefront of international CE development and 
implementation (SOU 2017:22). Sweden also has a long history of attempts at increasing 
circular material flows in society through recycling (e.g., Johansson, 2011; Sjöstrand, 2014). 
In the next section we present the recent history of environmental politics in Sweden. We then 
describe our method for analysis of press material, before using that material to analyze the 
CE debate in Sweden. We continue the paper with a discussion of the Swedish CE debate 
before we conclude with some critical thoughts on challenges for the future study of circular 
economies. 
 
2. Background: From consensus to conflict in Swedish environmental 
politics 
In the 20th century, the strongly Keynesian Social Democrat party dominated Swedish politics 
(Anshelm, 1995). An industrial society was maintained with increasing attention to 
sustainable processes and products, based on a belief that Swedish sustainability-oriented 
enterprise could flourish, delivering employment and economic growth, through green exports 
in an increasingly environmentally aware global competitive market. This position justified 
comparatively strict environmental regulations, interventionist economic and fiscal 
management, and active employment policy.  
Swedish centre-right liberal and conservative parliamentarians also argued that sound 
environmental politics could be achieved through competition between businesses developing 
green technologies – but favoured a more unregulated market driven by consumer choice 
(Anshelm, 2012). As opposed to active employment policy they supported lower taxes on 
work and more favorable business conditions. 
Despite some reservations about the value of economic growth, the Green Party has also 
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than proposed by other parties. In recent years, in political coalition with the Social 
Democrats the Greens have taken a pragmatic market-oriented stance, with few eco-socialist 
elements (Anshelm, 2012).  
All the mainstream Swedish parties have broadly embraced forms of ecological 
modernization in the area of environmental politics. Ecological modernization arose as an 
analytical concept in social science (Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000) but was adopted in Sweden 
by the social democratic government in the late 1990’s as a positive narrative vision of a 
green growth-based welfare state (Anshelm, 2002). Ecological modernization was introduced 
by Social Democrats but was largely supported by other political parties, albeit repurposed to 
suit liberal, conservative, or green agendas. This means that environmental problems have 
been interpreted as administrative issues to be solved with the aid of state interventions to 
create and structure consumer markets appropriately.  
Against this background, one might expect environmental issues to be depoliticized 
(Ranciere, 1995; Swyngedouw, 2010), and environmental conflicts limited. On the contrary, 
and especially in the last decade, there has been a strong repolitization of environmental 
issues in Sweden, expressed through local conflicts over controversial extraction and 
processing projects that have brought economic and resource concerns into conflict with 
biodiversity and sustainability aspirations (Anshelm et al., 2018a; Haikola and Anshelm, 
2016; Persson et al., 2017; Anshelm and Haikola, 2018).  
On the island of Gotland, for example, there has been a decade-long intense environmental 
conflict that reached not only Sweden's highest courts but even the European Court of Justice. 
An international company in the limestone industry had long-running plans to establish a 
quarry in the Ojnare forest, in an area that the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) had simultaneously sought to designate as Sweden's next national park (Anshelm et al., 
2018a).  
In this conflict, the mining industry, business organizations, and the Metal Workers' Union 
supported increased extraction for resource supply, economic and employment reasons 
(Anshelm et al., 2018a). The other side of the conflict brought together heterogeneous actors 
in an alliance between local groups on Gotland, environmental activists, the Swedish Society 
for Nature Conservation, the EPA, the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management, 
and local authorities. They argued that a quarry would harm both biodiversity and long-term 
employment opportunities. 
A similar pattern of environmental conflicts over natural resource extraction and processing 
projects involving similarly heterogenous coalitions could be found in many other parts of 
Sweden at the time; with examples including iron ore extraction at Kallak (Haikola and 
Anshelm, 2016; Persson et al., 2017); oil refinery expansion in Lysekil (Nyberg, 2019); and 
the extraction of rare earth metals at Lake Vättern (Anshelm and Haikola, 2018). The local 
protest groups in general emphasized circularity rather than linearity: industry ought to first 
and foremost handle resources already existing as ‘scrap’ or shutdown infrastructures in 
society before they turned to extracting primary resources (Anshelm et al., 2018b).  
Local resistance groups have coordinated nationally through loose networks where they 
exchanged experiences and skills. They have influenced public opinion, engaging national 
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legal challenges have reached parliament and the courts, further amplifying the conflicts to 
such a degree that resource extraction companies have expressed fear that mineral extraction 
would be banned in Sweden (Anshelm et al., 2018a). 
These natural resource conflicts have exposed divisions between parties that otherwise 
promoted ecological modernization. The Green Party and the Left Party sided with local 
environmental resistance groups while centre-right parties sided with industrial interests. The 
Social Democrats held an ambiguous position in the local conflicts. In the Ojnare conflict they 
first sided with labour and business interests as per their national mineral strategy, while they 
in the end decided to classify the forest as a Natura 2000 protected area (Anshelm et al., 
2018a), which was an obvious setback for industry interests. It is in this area of tension 
between a green industry ideology and heated local environmental conflicts over natural 
resource and processing projects that the debate about CE is playing out.  
 
3. Methods: analysis of press material 
The analysis in this study is based on printed press material with a focus on opinion pieces 
authored by and attributed to company representatives, public authorities, parliamentarians, 
and environmentally minded opinion makers. Material was collected using the Retriever 
search engine, which is the largest digital news archive in the Nordic region collecting news 
from print and digital editorial media back from the 1980s (Retriever, 2020).In the Retriever 
archive we searched all major Swedish newspapers, the business press and environmental 
journals for mention of the phrase ‘circular economy’ (‘cirkulär ekonomi’ in Swedish). This 
focus was chosen as these media are historically where environmental debate in Sweden has 
taken place (and these media are also prominent in contemporary online debate). The study 
period was set up to the research date in 2019, beginning from the first mention of the term in 
the Swedish press in 2012.  
From a total of 2000 articles we made a first read-through and identified almost 300 relevant 
articles that have formed the basis of our qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2004). In this 
type of analysis, the relevant articles are assumed to represent the valuations and statements of 
key actors at the time. Not all the articles are presented here, but those directly referenced in 
this study (see Appendix A) are illustrative of the major positions and value patterns present 
in the CE debate. We did not conduct any quantitative content analysis of the material (Riff et 
al., 2019).  
In a first step we closely read the selected 300 articles to establish the relevant content. Those 
parts of the material considered to be particularly significant in relation to the purpose of the 
research were marked (see Appendix A), repeatedly read, and coded manually into topics or 
themes. Thus, in this second step, a number of recurrent topics or themes were identified. 
These were: Swedish companies' demands for CE legislation; a CE as a way to strengthen 
Swedish companies' international competitiveness; environmental organizations' and the 
environmental movement's confidence in the economic and ecological opportunities of a CE; 
the Swedish authorities' positive assessment of the potential of a CE; Swedish political parties' 
approach to the proposition of a transition to a CE; the notion of Sweden as an international 
CE pioneer; alternative movements ambivalence to the idea of a CE; the strong convergence 
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and finally, explicit cooperation around a CE between organizations and actors who tend to 
take opposite environmental political positions and represent different interests.  
In a third step, these different themes were compared, and three overall categories were 
thereby established. Each theme touched on one or more economic, political and/or ecological 
aspects. We therefore chose to present the account of our analysis under these three category 
headings. Each category contains several themes and each theme can appear within one or 
more categories in our analysis. As an analytical framework these categories help us take into 
account opinions and agendas from actors that may have divergent core interests. The 
categorisation is not to be understood as three independent topics but rather as different areas 
of emphasis in the debate. The method is iterative and not linear: we repeatedly returned to 
the various steps to reinterpret the material to reach a gradual deepening of the analysis. 
Lastly, when analysing the categories, we particularly took notice of strong and recurring 
statements, contentions and contradictions, in order to identify the most affected and 
influential actors and their positions. Through this, we were able to distinguish positions on a 
CE taken by Swedish companies, public authorities, political parties, and opinion makers (our 
‘key actors’).  
The next section follows a structure driven by the content of the analyzed press material, 
presenting the positions taken by key actors in the three identified categories. As we present 
the material we interact with it critically. The categories are first outlined in terms of 
narratives of what a CE means for different actors, second we discuss these findings against 
current social science literature, thereby highlighting different economic, ecologic and 
political positions making for a deeper and broader understanding of how CE concepts are 
being developed and understood in Sweden. 
 
4. Results 
In what follows we describe and analyse the debate that addresses a CE in Sweden, with a 
focus on the positions taken by the key actors in relation to the identified categories.  
As of the early 2010’s, company representatives, public authorities, parliamentarians, and 
environmentally minded opinion makers in Sweden all began to express support for the idea 
of a CE. These actors at times expressed differing understandings of the meaning of 
circularity, but there was, and remains, significant convergence on the central idea that a CE 
is desirable and should be pursued and implemented. Here we examine how this convergence 
emerged and manifested, what arguments were presented for a CE transition, and what 
measures were recommended for this to be realized.  
 
4.1 The economics of circularity 
Following several years in which CE narratives increasingly featured in economic and 
political commentary, in 2016, the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation released a ‘smart 
industry strategy’ which presented a CE as a way to “create solutions for societal challenges, 
as well as bring competitive advantages and opportunities for sustainable growth” (GOS, 
2016:19). Representatives of the Swedish Recycling Industries Association proclaimed that a 
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circular economy – something that is absolutely central, not least for the climate and jobs” 
(Article 1).  
The same spring, the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences, large companies with 
a marked Swedish identity operating in the global market, such as Volvo, H&M, Alfa-Laval 
and Södra, domestic companies, representatives of research councils, as well as the EPA and 
the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth, co-signed a petition in support for 
greater CE action. In their support for a more circular economy they proposed that Sweden 
should be a “leading nation in resource efficiency”, (Article 2). Overall such grandiose but 
vague expressions dominated the debate.  
Corporations demanded new environmental regulations, including a CE strategy, so that 
“companies that have so far been profitable dare to invest in the growing fossil-free 
economy” (Article 3). If policy didn’t favor Swedish companies, they argued, the country 
could lose its deemed leading position on the increasingly fossil-free world market. The 
sustainability manager at IKEA, Jonas Carlehed, stressed that national legislation and 
proactive politics would play a key role in fostering a new economy:  
“We need a new economic model which is not dependent on virgin materials, where products 
are increasingly based on renewable materials and energy, where energy use is maximally 
effective, where products are designed to last a long time, and we need to facilitate recycling, 
dismantling, reuse and reconditioning” (Article 4).  
For corporations, appealing to national interests made sense since much of natural resource 
legislation takes place at the governmental level. Companies continually argued that for a CE 
to be successful (Article 5), tougher environmental regulations were required to “force 
companies in the right direction” (Article 6), and “stricter climate objectives in the EU” was 
invoked “for the sake of competitiveness” (Article 3). While even neo-liberal business 
interests do not eschew regulation (Harcourt, 2011; Mirowksi, 2013), this was in great 
contrast to the heated legal conflicts over natural resource extraction and processing projects 
playing out all over Sweden at the same time. 
CE was also presented as a contribution to global climate mitigation. Representatives of 
Axfood, H&M, Ikea, NCC, SSAB and others argued that the Paris agreement could not be 
achieved at all without re-use and recycled materials, while researchers from the Stockholm 
Resilience Center argued that a CE was one of the prerequisites for reaching the IPCC's 1.5-
degree target (Articles 1, 3, 5, 7-11). From this position, a sustainable transition to a circular 
society required political initiatives and actions by cities, industries, and countries, amongst 
other actors, but could not be left to individual consumers in the market.  
At the practical level, however, the examples of desired regulation offered were much less 
ambitious. For example, Carlehed of IKEA asked for more circularity, 
“to enable companies to take responsibility for product repair, resale, or recycling, 
regardless of whether the consumer now regards the product as waste… it is of great 
importance for a functioning circular economy not to monopolize the collection of reusable 
products, materials and resources” (Article 4).  
Despite large business interests’ apparent commitment to CE as a strategy, there are 
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linear economy as the enemy (Anshelm et al., 2018b), there are no resource extraction 
businesses, nor any other business interests directly arguing that increased circularity should 
lead to more sustainable natural resource management or a reduction on the dependence on 
now contested (Swedish) resources. CE is promoted in the debate by resource-consuming 
businesses and the forest industry, the steel industry, and the mining industry, alike, but not in 
relation to local conflicts. 
There is also a noticeable lacuna about how the transition to circularity will be financed – a 
question ignored behind simplistic claims that reducing waste will deliver financial savings, 
e.g., ”the recycling industries expect that SEK 11 billion could be ‘recovered’ within a period 
of 20 years – provided that Sweden is moving towards an increasingly circular economy” 
(Article 12). 
These examples act as reminders of the role regulation plays for market formation in the 
global economy (Harcourt, 2011; Mirowksi, 2013), suggesting that ideas of circularity might 
be attractive for corporate actors as a sustainability strategy only if designed and adjusted in 
line with their market interests. There is little to gain for most companies in publicly 
connecting the general idea of CE with current Swedish conflicts over natural resource 
projects. The business sector therefore advocates for increased national regulation of a CE 
even while specific companies continue to defend linear economy practices in legal battles 
over local extractive activities. This leaves questions of huge environmental import: for 
example, what would a CE mean – and over what timescales - for economic growth, overall 
extraction volumes, and the specific localities where extraction currently occurs or is 
proposed?  
Business arguments for enabling regulation and support from government presume that such 
measures would stimulate innovation and change consumer behavior, releasing profitable and 
employment-generating potential for CE practices. From an economic perspective, a CE was 
thus presented as something that business could generally support because it would be 
profitable, reducing resource dependency and waste management costs, while increasing 
international competitiveness, with little effect on local linear practices. This suggests that for 
business the CE ideal is government policy which focuses on recycling, recovery, and the 
consumer behaviour end while not imposing new rules on extraction or export of resources. 
 
4.2 The politics of circularity 
Between 2014 and 2019 the Social Democrats and the Green Party were in a coalition 
government (since 2018, a minority government). Their main political opposition was the 
centre-right liberal conservative political alliance. At the same time as political tensions over 
local natural resource extraction and processing projects were high how did parliamentarians 
react to stricter environmental policy demands from business interests regarding a CE?  
The Green Party argued already in early 2014 for a more circular economy prioritizing reuse 
and repair (Article 13), and their youth party spokesperson argued in Sweden’s largest daily 
that  
“economic growth without increased emissions is now possible. Thus, a new green economic 
critique is needed. Instead of growth criticism, the discussion of the future should be more 
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Historically, the Green Party built their political programme on climate and environmental 
issues (including more circularity), but their impact on economic policy was limited. So, 
when several of the largest Swedish companies became advocates of a CE, a window of 
opportunity opened for the party to become economically relevant. The Greens’ Per Bolund, 
Minister of Financial Markets in the coalition government, declared that the party would 
address its general crisis of confidence and declining popularity by showing leadership in the 
economic debate (Article 15). This was done though the presentation of a “green economy 
package” with a CE as the overall theme and increased support for services promoting 
recycling and sharing of resources through mechanisms such as such as tax breaks for repair, 
and support for ‘sharing economy’ platforms for carpooling and accommodation. 
In January 2016, the Green Party’s policy shift can be said to have had a first impact, when 
the government appointed a committee with the task of proposing new instruments and laws 
to promote increased re-use and prevention of waste, to thereby achieve “a more resource-
efficient and circular economy" (Dir 2016:3). The task of the investigation was primarily to 
regulate the conditions for consumer products, but the committee was also to investigate 
measures for decoupling economic growth and environmental degradation, which was entirely 
in line with the Green Party's claims that sustainable growth would be possible in a more 
circular economy. 
In March 2017, the CE committee reported (SOU 2017:22). It suggested several concrete 
proposals: for example, tax deductions for repairs and second-hand sales; measures to 
facilitate carpooling and to simplify household waste reduction; reinforced consumer 
protection in secondhand consumption; and more. The long-term goal set by the committee 
was to support a CE transition. The investigation also led to the establishment of an advisory 
board for the government: The Commission for the Circular Economy, with the purpose of 
strengthening the transition to a resource-efficient, circular and bio-based economy. 
Later in 2017, the Green Party presented a comprehensive proposal for a new economic 
policy with the goal that Sweden would switch to a completely circular economy:  
“The Green Party has begun a historic transition of Sweden… the tax on emissions is 
increased while the tax on enterprise, jobs and repairs are lowered. We have raised the 
environmental budget by 82 percent... We have propelled a climate law, an agreement of 100 
percent renewable electricity and invested more than any other country per capita on 
international climate support... The next step is to change the entire economic policy” 
(Article 16)  
Thus, the large corporations and the Green Party now seemed to have common interests and 
set the tone of the debate on CE since 2017, something that just a few years previously would 
have seemed completely implausible due to them considering each other with the greatest 
suspicion (Anshelm 2012). This was visibly in contrast to the heated arguments continuing 
elsewhere between business interests and the Green Party over natural resource extraction 
projects and suggests that the CE concept may be acting here as an ambiguous convening 
device. 
Even though the Social Democrats commissioned the investigation, they kept a lower profile 
than their Green Party coalition partner. The Minister of Infrastructure, Social Democrat Anna 
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a CE (Article 17), and Minister of Enterprise, Social Democrat Mikael Damberg claimed that 
a transition to more circularity was “necessary”, not least to ensure economic 
competitiveness and employment (Article 18).  
Later, in their election manifesto for 2018, the Social Democrats also included several 
proposals for increased circularity, such as a deposit scheme for used mobile phones and 
electronic scrap, tighter legal requirements on packaging, and more efficient textile recycling 
(Articles 19-20). Labour interests also generally kept a low profile in the CE debate; although 
the Swedish Trade Union Confederation endorsed the Government-appointed CE committee 
investigation and while arguing that labour interests should be safeguarded in a transition to 
more circularity (LO, 2017).  
Although the CE investigation solidified a convergent position between large companies and 
the red-green government, the former still demanded stricter regulations and more company 
control. For example, Carlehed of IKEA argued for stricter waste rules in order to ”create the 
conditions for an economic, sustainable and circular society that in turn supports Sweden's 
business and competitiveness” (Article 4). And representatives for Electrolux and the 
Association of Swedish Engineering Industries advocated for a revision of European laws, 
rules and policies to “promote more circular and sustainable free trade solutions…” (Article 
21).  
While seemingly contradictory, one way to understand this call for more legislation is to see it 
as a practice of what we can call ‘resilient capital’: a mechanism for increased control over 
resources by companies facing political pressures. Against a background of mounting climate 
change policies, local environmental conflicts and political support for circularity, industry 
wanted to shape a political agenda to secure control over resources and investments. For 
resource-using industries such an agenda offers an opportunity to establish new product 
niches. These examples hint at the pragmatism guiding the convergence of understandings in 
the debate, building on the ambiguity of the CE idea. Temporality of course matters here: 
even calling for national legislation pushes the moment of corporate adoption of a CE into the 
future, which could be of particular importance for resource extracting industries.  
In contrast, the liberal and conservative parties who have long been positioned as the most 
large-business-friendly had relatively little to say about a CE. In neo-liberal spirit, they 
interpreted the CE concept as being about making it easier for individuals to recycle 
household waste (Article 22). The centre-right liberal conservative political alliance suggested 
consumer solutions and otherwise largely eschewed government regulation and legislation:  
“We propose stricter requirements for collection systems, increased accessibility and equal 
service throughout the country. This service should be free of charge for the households and 
the guaranteed service level financed by the producers... [and we propose] increased 
innovation in the recycling sector through deregulation” (Article 23).  
In this respect, the liberal and conservative parliamentarians underlined individual freedoms 
far more than did the business interests they are often assumed to represent. They even faced 
surprising criticism from free market think tank Timbro who claimed that they showed no 
political initiatives on the CE issue "despite the EU facing major choices in the coming years, 
[liberal and conservative parliamentarians do] not appear to have their own ideas of the 
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It seems that rhetorical radical market liberalism regarding environmental concerns had 
perhaps outlived its value for the large companies, which anticipate having to change their 
production in the foreseeable future, while centre-right politicians remained as supporters of 
orthodox neoliberalism. Instead, the companies that supported a CE policy found sympathy 
within the red-green coalition, especially in the small and previously marginalized Green 
Party, to introduce enabling regulations.  
While business interests went further in their rhetorical support for circularity than the red-
green coalition, and while the liberal-conservative alliance mostly ignored CE ideas, overall 
there was convergence in the debate. The underlying environmental politics was a pragmatist 
and rationalist view of ‘green industry’ policy shared by corporations and parliamentarians 
alike, despite divergent positions on local resource conflicts. 
 
4.3 The ecologics of circularity 
Several environmental NGOs and the EPA joined the corporations in adding pressure on the 
politicians to regulate for a CE (Article 25). Despite the preceding and ongoing environmental 
conflicts over natural resource extraction, the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation 
(SSNC) even published joint articles with industrial actors on several occasions (Articles 11, 
26). A specifically noteworthy episode was when the Secretary General of SSNC, Svante 
Axelsson, together with SVEMIN (the Swedish industry association of mines, mineral and 
metal producers) published an opinion piece in support of underground Carbon Capture and 
Storage and ”fossil-free mining” as a form of CE:  
“The development of the circular economy is also an important key in creating a completely 
fossil-free mining and mineral industry... However, the development will take time and be 
capital intensive. Therefore, it is important that politics facilitates the change through 
concrete measures” (Article 26).  
Here SSNC support the idea that even mining can be somehow ‘circular’, while in the local 
conflicts over natural resource extraction and management they emphasize recovery and reuse 
of materials in opposition to resource extraction (Anshelm et al., 2018b). Again, we see in this 
contradiction the potential ambiguity in the CE concept, in which it might simultaneously hint 
at less climate polluting mining activities, while also legitimating a necessarily slow transition 
in the extractive industries to maintain jobs and profits.  
One individual who came to symbolize the convergence between representatives of 
environmental interests, industry and the government was Anders Wijkman. In his roles as the 
chairman of the Club of Rome in Sweden, chairman of the Swedish Recycling Industries 
Association, and chairman of the national cross-party Committee on Environmental 
Objectives, Wijkman became a prominent spokesperson for the idea that Sweden must adopt 
a circular economy, as replacement for a linear one that had exhausted both its economic and 
ecological possibilities (Articles 27-29). According to this position industry was the main 
driver of CE processes and politicians ought to support their endeavors through e.g., value-
added tax exemption on recycled materials (Article 29). This exemplifies an understanding of 
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Although opinion makers such as Wijkman, and Johan Rockström of the Stockholm 
Resilience Centre, have also expressed criticisms of economic growth (Articles 30-31), the 
specific measures they propose to promote circularity reflect a support for incremental 
solutions apparently compatible with continued growth, such as increased energy efficiency, 
carbon pricing, and cleaner technologies (Articles 31-32). Arguably their support for a CE is 
expressed as a quest for ‘eco-efficiency’ in which circularity is pragmatically coopted into the 
existing economic system, rather than actively seeking to transform it.  
These opinion-makers acted as bridge builders between industry, government, and 
environmental interests, providing both economic and environmental arguments for the 
introduction of a CE. For example, Wijkman, representatives of IKEA, the Swedish union of 
forestry, wood and graphical workers, and the Stockholm Resilience Center together argued 
that a CE transition would lead to the creation of 100,000 new green jobs (Articles 9, 28, 33). 
This highlights another way in which the ambiguity of CE ideas can ‘hide’ political 
contradictions and bring together different interests. A CE can be understood simultaneously 
as a way to resist and even close down extractive activities, but also as a way to rebrand those 
activities as a fundamental part of Sweden’s sustainable future (with a gradual transition in 
business models that maintains jobs and profits). 
Johan Ehrenberg, an ecologically and socialist-oriented opinion maker, newspaper editor and 
renewable energy entrepreneur, extended the argument: through more circularity, ‘economic 
growth’ would become a solution to global ecological and social problems (Article 34):  
“With enforced reuse [of materials] and a circular economy, one [planet earth] is enough [to 
sustain humanity]. Growth can be infinite in a finite world because growth is about goods and 
services being made smarter and smarter and giving people more and more time for other 
than toil” (Articles 35).  
The idea of compatibility of circular economic growth with environmental considerations 
received strong support from environmental organizations, environmentally minded opinion 
makers, large company CEOs, and the Minister of Environment, amongst others (Articles 2-5, 
11, 21, 25, 28-29, 36-39).  
Despite this optimism, the converging CE narrative in Sweden did face criticism. But critical 
voices were few and surprisingly uninfluential in the CE debate. Even when mainstream 
economists from Swedish academia and the state agency the National Institute of Economic 
Research objected to the dominant narrative, their views - that achieving circularity, even if 
viable, would be of no economic benefit since some industry sectors would gain from it while 
others would lose (Articles 40-41) – had little impact.  
Marginal criticism came also from the extra-parliamentary left arguing that CE rhetoric was 
not being translated into practical action (Articles 42-46) but risked becoming a new 
‘greenwashing’ tool for CE advocates such as H&M and Volvo (Article 47). But even here 
the concept of CE was being mobilized positively: in this case in support of more disruptive 
societal and environmental change. Yet, even the critical voices did not connect a CE to the 
local environmental conflicts playing out during the same period in Sweden. 
The overwhelming consensus was that the linear economic model, based on the extraction of 
new natural resources and rapid consumption and turnover of products, had become an 
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contrast, a circular economy was seen as the way to continue to provide goods and services to 
sustain and spread high levels of welfare. 
 
5. Discussion: Interpreting the circular economy debate in Sweden 
We have analyzed the CE debate in Swedish press material between the years 2012 and 2019 
with a focus on opinion pieces by company representatives, public authorities, political 
parties, and environmentally minded opinion makers. Despite the recent history of local 
environmental conflicts in Sweden, in the national debate the idea of CE was (almost without 
exception) uncritically incorporated in a pre-existing narrative in which global market 
competitiveness could be prioritized, perfectly balancing within planetary ecological 
boundaries (Anshelm, 2012).  
Within this narrative, the CE concept promised to erase the need for conflicts between 
economic demands and ecological considerations. Key Swedish actors have converged on this 
common narrative from different directions. Green Party representatives increasingly 
acknowledged that large corporations, and not just small business, had to play an important 
positive role in the response to climate change. In turn, large companies adapted to a certain 
extent to the Green Party’s views on resource use and the role of environmental legislation in 
securing conditions for production. Extractive and resource-consuming businesses alike 
supported increased circularity. 
Social Democrats supported the idea of more circularity through commissioning a CE 
investigation. And they generally endorsed aiming to increase eco-efficiency and circularity 
in the existing economic system, as advocated by environmentally minded opinion makers 
and large business interests. Liberal and conservative parliamentarians underlined individual 
freedoms in the CE debate, which set them apart from business interests. But overall the CE 
debate was, and is, characterised by a notable convergence around the idea that the 
implementation of a CE could proceed without political disputation.  
The CE narratives in Sweden broadly reflect the historic evolution from waste management to 
resource management identified by Rieke and colleagues (2017), and the themes of idealized 
circularity, new roles for consumers, economic growth, and renewal though competitiveness 
identified at the European level by Lazarevic and Valve (2017). 
Thus, the local conflicts over natural resources raging in Sweden at the same time appear to 
have had no direct impact on the CE debate. Rather these debates are running parallel, as to a 
large degree the same political parties, the same companies, the same industry organizations, 
and the same environmental organizations, which are opposed in local conflicts, are in full 
agreement on the implementation of a CE. This disconnect between CE politics and natural 
resource politics in Sweden is all the more striking because Sweden is – in contrast with the 
EU as a whole – a net resource exporter. This all begs the question: how can we explain that 
the debate on CE in Sweden is seemingly so depoliticized?  
 
6. Conclusion: Circularity, ambiguity and resilient capital 
We have highlighted several ways in which the ambiguity of the CE concept has enabled at 
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this extends to the apparent tension between local conflicts and national CE rhetoric to 
terminate the linear (extractive) economy. Locally, heterogenous groups are resisting 
extraction, arguing that biodiversity and even long-term economic wellbeing are threatened 
by it, and that resource recycling is preferable; while industry insists that new extractive 
developments are essential for jobs and growth. Nationally in contrast, the idea of a CE allows 
the Greens and industry together to call for growth and sustainability based on a vaguely 
articulated, and potentially gradual, transition away from extractivism involving more 
recycling of resources, and reuse or restoration of mining facilities in activities such as carbon 
storage.  
It is possible that the Greens see a CE as a ‘trojan horse’ which can transform business and 
bring an end to extractive activities through the leverage of manufacturing companies 
adopting circular practices. Or that businesses see it as a greenwashing tool which allows 
them to maintain a green image nationally and internationally, despite local conflicts. Neither 
goal would be openly discussed. In this respect it may be significant that the practical 
measures of circularity proposed and implemented so far engage with eco-modern urban 
sensibilities about repair, recycling and consumer products; rather than with policies and 
practices of extractive industries in remote and rural settings.   
We do not see the CE debate as something generated by the local conflicts, although this 
tension might have contributed to the specific ways in which CE ideas has been adopted in 
Swedish environmental discourse. However it does seem likely that CE ideas have been 
adopted as the most recent expression of the long-standing ecological modernization 
discourse, which in Sweden has consistently acted to depoliticize national environmental 
policy, and obscure any contradictions between Sweden’s role as a major exporter of natural 
resources (particularly iron, copper and forest products) and its self-image as an 
environmental leader.  
All this suggests that critical questions regarding both the business economics and politics of 
a CE transition remain to be answered. In the debate the CE concept is presented as a 
managerial and technocratic, matter-of-fact issue, rather than a social and political issue and it 
becomes seemingly unpolitical. However, the practical implications of a CE for extractive 
industry in Sweden remain entirely opaque despite the potential for situated conflicts, not only 
over extractive activities but also over industrial scale reprocessing activities.  
In this respect it is telling that any social and environmental transformative potential of a CE 
has largely mutated into a technocratic transition (Stirling, 2015). The transition foreseen 
involves few if any changes to the existing social and economic relations, nor in the role of 
governments as ‘guardians of the rules of the market’. In these ways the ideas of a CE in 
Sweden is a profoundly conservative project, a product of confidence in expert governance, in 
which large companies are considered to have the right, the will and the knowledge to reform 
industrial capitalism in a way that they deem to be sustainable. 
Moreover, the mainstream CE narrative fails to problematize this transition in the context of 
critiques of capitalist economics from the perspectives of growth and consumerism (Jackson, 
2009), distributional aspects (Piketty, 2014), or the tendency of capitalism to generate 
recurring crises (Harvey, 2010; Mirowski, 2014). This can be understood as an expression of 
a de-politicized or post-political condition (Straume and Humphrey, 2010; Swyngedouw, 
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1995) are welling up in the form of local struggles. The organization of a CE is not considered 
as being part of the political arena, but rather is understood as a managerial problem being 
solved by administrative mechanisms and institutions that all concur on the benevolence of 
green industrial growth (Blühdorn, 2004).  
Depoliticization acts alongside ambiguity to give the CE concept more convening power. 
Different groups can organize around it even if their understandings and interests differ, 
especially if each group sees individual benefits. On the one hand, this can represent a 
‘rational utopia’ (Ntsondé and Aggeri, 2019), with the hope that common CE visions, 
cognitive images and strategies will lead to more sustainable modes of living in practice. On 
the other hand, CE becomes not only an ‘umbrella concept’ as Blomsma and Brennan (2017) 
suggest, but also a ‘floating signifier’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001)), as the concept moves 
between and connects with diverse projects. In this respect, what matters is not the conceptual 
content of the signifier, “but rather, its filling-function or … capacity to attract and organize 
different strands of filling-content” (Valenzuela and Böhm, 2017, p.34), Such a signifier 
provides “a singular representation which serves to institute or ‘frame’ meanings of universal 
reach, hegemonic dominance and a naturalized feel” (ibid).  
CE includes tools for re-orienting waste management, retail, or industry towards more 
circular/sustainable practices and less wasteful material flows, but, much like the term 
‘sustainability’ it is malleable and could be applied in ways that maintain the status quo as 
much as to facilitate transformative change. Lazarevic and Valve (2017) suggest that for CE 
proponents the vagueness characterizing the concept represents a deliberate short-term 
strategy for making it less controversial.  
As a floating signifier the CE concept can therefore serve different purposes at different 
scales: it might stimulate reorganisation of business processes in particular corporations or 
industry branches, while at the same time, at the national level disempower calls for economic 
transformation and hide underlying environmental conflicts. This largely unspecified, 
beneficial generic form of the CE concept is mirrored in academic literature, and we urge 
scholars to question and explore the specific political economy of ideas of CE, and the 
business models they imply, as much as they examine the technological mechanics, or 
environmental implications of CE in particular business sectors. 
In the discourses of the CE debate in Sweden, we see a set of practices that might be deployed 
not in ways that disrupt linear economies, but which stabilize existing interests’ control over 
capital in the face of unstable world markets. For the companies the circular transition is 
partly about survival on a volatile market (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013). CE strategies 
present large companies with opportunities to increase control of natural resources through 
governmental action. This means increased business control of resources, production chains, 
and consumption (through sharing, leasing, and repair, etc.).  
For the broader interests of capital as a whole the commoditization of waste flows in a CE 
model (enabled by government regulation) can be understood as a means of opening a new 
sectoral arena in which to create and speculate on financial assets. Harvey (2010) describes 
such processes as typical strategies for capital renewal following periodic crises. In this 
respect the global timing of CE discourses might be seen as one consequence of the 2008 
financial crisis. This increased control over capital and resources by companies facing 
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Should we conclude that the unexpected consensus in the Swedish CE debate is a product of 
the harnessing of possible disruptive technologies by resilient capital to avoid economic 
transformation? Support for such an interpretation comes from Goldstein’s (2018) description 
of the ways in which 'cleantech' innovations more generally are reconstructed by investors 
and venture capitalists as incremental technological enhancements to existing industrial 
processes. Despite aspirations for environmental and economic disruption through 
technological innovation Goldstein shows how the entrepreneurs involved are ‘disciplined’ by 
the investors and financiers so as to generate a more rapid return on investments, while the 
technologies are locked into deployments that bring limited environmental benefits. 
The effectiveness of resilient capital in shaping the dominant discourse of CE in Sweden, with 
associated narratives of international competitiveness and job-creation, perhaps signals 
continued path towards ‘sustaining’ consumerism, extractivism, and (liberal) capitalism. But 
the potential remains for green values to subvert business strategies, or for material failures of 
corporate circularity initiatives to lead to policies more in keeping with the rhetoric of the 
concept, or for the rebalancing of the economy towards repair and craft skills to shift broader 
consumer values and make CE more disruptive in practice. 
One of the main differences between previous studies and our result presented here is that the 
mainstream discourse in the scientific literature typically takes an instrumental understanding 
of the CE concept; it is understood almost solely as the application of ‘science’ and ‘systems’ 
thinking on material flows in order to reduce waste and environmental impact (Webster, 
2017), thereby hiding political contentions. We have exposed these contentions, and our 
results could be used to improve CE studies at the Swedish scale and beyond. We particularly 
suggest a need for more attention to scale (national/local), to comparisons between national 
cultures and diverse sectors, and to stakeholder motivations in trying to develop practical 
policy. Future deliberative or ethnographic research will be needed to unpick the motivations 
and impacts of the diverse interests that have converged around the idea of a CE. But it is 
already clear that a superficial reading of the concept hides serious potential conflicts. If a CE 
is to deliver new values and lifestyles, or broader economic transformation, it will matter 
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